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Political behavior pervades strategic decision-making, often damaging decision quality and 
undermining organizational performance. However, little s currently known about how top 
management teams (TMTs) cope with such behavior. To address this major shortfall, we 
draw on the upper echelons literature to advance a contingent account of the factors that 
differentiate well-functioning and dysfunctional TMTs. Focusing on the psychological 
context surrounding the TMT, we theorize that cognitive consensus, power decentralization, 
and behavioral integration are key generative mechanisms that enable TMTs to countermand 
the potentially deleterious consequences of politica  behavior. We corroborate our theorizing 
using a field study of 117 strategic decisions, drawn from multiple TMT informants and 
secondary databases. Confirming the majority of our hypotheses, our findings indicate that 
behaviorally integrated and decentralized TMTs are better equipped to attenuate the 
potentially damaging effects of organizational politics, thereby safeguarding the quality of 
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“In strategic decision-making the major issue you’ve got to deal with is politics. For me, 
that’s the single biggest thing you can get right or wrong.” (Senior Vice President, Global 
Healthcare Company). 
 
Political behavior is a central construct in organiz tional theory (Baldridge, 1971; 
March, 1962; Pfeffer, 1981; Quinn, 1980; Vigoda-Gadot and Drory, 2016), and in the 
strategic decision-making literature it is widely accepted that political behavior often 
damages decision quality and undermines organizational performance (Bourgeois and 
Eisenhardt, 1988; Dayan et al., 2011; Dean and Sharfman, 1996; Elbanna, 2006; Elbanna, 
2018; Walter et al., 2012). Strategic decision-making is an inherently political process (Child 
et al., 2010; Pettigrew, 1973), which, by definition, provokes conflicting viewpoints (Allison, 
1971) and triggers power struggles (Pettigrew, 1973; Pfeffer, 1981), not least because 
organizations are formed of coalitions with competing interests (Cyert and March, 1963; 
Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 1988; Eisenhardt and Zbaracki, 1992; March, 1962) and because 
strategic decisions are highly consequential, complex, and judgmental in nature (Elbanna et 
al., 2017; Mintzberg et al., 1976). For all of these reasons most strategic decisions are subject 
to at least some degree of political behavior (Cyert and March, 1963; Eisenhardt and 
Bourgeois, 1988; Eisenhardt and Zbaracki, 1992; March, 1962; Pettigrew, 1973, 1985) and 
not surprisingly, empirical evidence has shown thatpolitical behavior negatively impacts on 
decision effectiveness and organizational performance (e.g. Dean and Sharfman, 1996; 
Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 1988; Elbanna and Child, 2007).  
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Political behavior such as bargaining, forming alliances, lobbying and coopting 
(Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 1988) can provoke retaliatory interpersonal hostilities, risking 
missed opportunities and delayed responses. Political behavior can also result in information 
being distorted, withheld or manipulated (Dean and Sharfman, 1996); and the decision 
process can become insular and inward looking—neglecting important environmental 
considerations that might influence the viability of the decision at hand (Hickson et al., 
1986).  
Since political behavior is pervasive, and often damaging, there is a clear need for 
research to establish the boundary conditions under which TMTs, who have chief 
responsibility for strategic decision-making (cf. Floyd and Wooldridge, 2000), are able to 
countermand its negative effects, thereby safeguarding the quality their decision processes. 
However, despite longstanding consensus on the importance of studying contextual 
contingency factors to understand better the contextual mechanisms that promote 
organizational effectiveness (e.g. Brouthers et al., 2000; Hart and Banbury, 1994; Johns, 
2006; 2017; Rajagopalan et al., 1993), surprisingly few studies have examined moderating 
influences on the political behavior-decision quality relationship (Child et al., 2010). Hence, 
the boundary conditions of political behavior remain little understood.  
To address this major shortfall, the present article draws on the upper echelons 
literature (Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Hambrick, 2007) to advance a contingent account of 
the factors that differentiate well-functioning and dysfunctional TMTs. To provide new 
theoretical insights into the mechanisms enabling TMTs to withstand political behavior, we 
employ a direct psychometric approach in the development and testing of our theoretical 
model. In doing so, we avoid the “black box” criticisms that have been levelled at prior TMT 
research for employing demographic variables as surrogates for the TMTs underlying 
psychological attributes (Hodgkinson and Sparrow, 2002; Lawrence, 1997; Markoczy, 1997; 
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Pettigrew, 1992; Priem et al., 1999). We report findings from a field study utilizing multi-
informant, multi-source data drawn from surveys andsecondary databases. Our findings 
provide important theoretical insights into the boundary conditions of political behavior, by 
highlighting the centrality of the TMT’s underlying psychological context, which moderates 
the extent to which potentially dysfunctional political behavior undermines decision quality. 
As well as advancing new theory, our findings provide salient insights for practice. 
Accordingly, we detail a series of concrete actions that can be readily implemented by 
executive teams seeking to enhance their prospects for minimizing the dangers outlined in 
this article. Specifically, we discuss recruiting leaders with a servant leadership style and 
collectivist orientation, as well as undertaking strategy away days and formal team interaction 
training—all of which develop a TMT’s ability to withstand political behavior.   
 
Theory and hypotheses 
Executive team members engage in political behavior to influence the strategic 
agenda. When doing so, they are often strategic in their use of information, employing tactics 
such as behind the scenes bargaining, forming alliances, lobbying and coopting (Eisenhardt 
and Bourgeois, 1988). Such behavior can, and frequently does, provoke retaliatory 
interpersonal conflict and impede information elabor ti n. However, not all TMTs react 
similarly when facing such potentially divisive behavior. Some teams are better equipped to 
prevent the effects of politics escalating to dysfunctional levels—such teams instead seek to 
integrate individual preferences, while taking step to actively promote the information 
elaboration ultimately required to safeguard the quality of their decision processes, and 




Political behavior manifests in the use of power and exercise of influence (Child et al., 
2010), and is inevitable during strategic decision-making because organizations are formed of 
coalitions of individuals, all with competing interests (Eisenhardt and Zbaracki, 1992). 
Conflicting preferences arise from differences in personal ambitions and interests, and from 
decision-makers’ differing functional or hierarchical positions within the organization 
(Allison, 1971). Furthermore, strategic decisions have high stakes—with significant financial 
and long-term implications for the organization—and s such, they provoke highly emotive 
responses among decision-makers. Strategic decisions are also inherently uncertain, 
ambiguous, novel, and ill-structured—prompting clashes between decision-makers as to the 
best course of action.  
 Overall, empirical evidence indicates political behavior has largely negative 
consequences, damaging organizational performance and undermining decision effectiveness 
(Dean and Sharfman, 1996; Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 1988; Elbanna and Child, 2007). 
However, there is an alternative perspective viewing politics as a force for good (Kane-
Frieder et al., 2013), and an important mechanism for adapting to change in the external 
environment (Daft, 1983; Pfeffer, 1981). This perspctive views political behavior as a means 
of resolving conflict, building relationships, restoring justice, and developing legitimacy 
(Hochwarter, 2012). Effective use of politics can also result in positive individual level 
outcomes including leadership effectiveness, individual performance, career success, and 
stress management (Kimura, 2015), all of which positively impact organizational and 
decision outcomes. Recent empirical evidence also show  positive politics can influence 
decision creativity and propitiousness (Elbanna et l., 2017), suggesting that political 
behavior might not be as damaging as many accounts s ggest.  
Prior reviews of strategic decision-making research identify four salient categories of 
contextual variables pertaining to the TMT, the external environment, the decision itself, and 
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the firm (Rajagopalan et al., 1993; Shepherd and Rud, 2014). While Elbanna and Child 
(2007) examined the moderating effects of environmetal, decision and firm characteristics 
on the relationship between politics and decision success, this line of inquiry has not so far 
included TMT moderators. The TMT, or upper echelons perspective (Hambrick and Mason, 
1984), represents a key internal context (Escribá-Esteve et al., 2008) since TMTs “make 
decisions and engage in behaviors that affect the health, wealth, and welfare of others—but 
they do so as flawed human beings.” (Hambrick and Mason, 2007: 341).  
Overall in the strategic decision-making literature th re is limited empirical work 
operationalizing TMT variables as moderators of the relationships between strategic decision 
process characteristics and outcomes (Shepherd and Rud , 2014), and while the direct effects 
of TMT characteristics on decision processes and outcomes have been studied (e.g., Hough 
and ogilvie, 2005; Papadakis and Barwise, 2002; Papad kis et al., 1998), relatively little is 
known about how TMT characteristics moderate the eff cts of important decision processes 
such as political behavior. Indeed, Elbanna and Child (2007: 449) urge: “future research 
could consider additional moderating variables, such as top management characteristics.” 
Strategy research in general requires greater psychological grounding (Hambrick and 
Crossland, 2018; Hodgkinson and Sparrow, 2002; Powell et al., 2011), and in particular, 
extant accounts of politics in strategic decision-making have tended to downplay the 
significance of the TMT’s underlying psychological ontext. This represents a significant 
limitation, not least because political behavior, by definition, arises from fundamental 
differences of interpretation, judgment, decision making, and social cognition; and these 
differences ultimately drive the conduct of top teams (cf. Hodgkinson and Johnson, 1994; 
Pettigrew, 1992; Elbanna, 2006). Furthermore, the ext nt to which politics undermines 
decision quality is dependent upon whether such teams have the necessary psychological 
attributes to handle political behavior skillfully (Child et al., 2010; Silvester and Wyatt, 
7 
 
2018). Hence by not accounting for the contingent influence of TMT characteristics, current 
theory offers an incomplete portrayal of politics, over-simplifying the underlying intra-group 
cognitive and social psychological mechanisms in play. We thus contend that a focus on the 
team’s psychological context is much needed in order to advance theory concerning why 
politics can, and often does, have highly damaging consequences for some teams, but less 
damaging consequences for other teams. To address this i sue we adopt an upper echelons 
perspective (Hambrick, 2007; Hambrick and Mason, 1984) and in so doing, we examine the 
moderating effects of three TMT characteristics in particular on the relationship between 
politics and decision quality.  
As outlined in Figure 1, we theorize that the negative effects of political behavior are 
moderated on the basis of varying levels of cognitive consensus, power decentralization, and 
behavioral integration. We incorporate cognitive consensus into our model because shared 
beliefs and common understanding of strategic issues fosters intragroup trust and cohesion 
(Cannon-Bowers and Salas, 2001; Healey et al., 2015; Kellermans et al., 2005); implying that 
in teams characterized by higher levels of consensus, responses to political behavior will be 
less aggressive and hence less likely to undermine co structive debate and information 
elaboration. We incorporate power decentralization into our model because prior theory 
suggests that power asymmetries lessen psychological safety and trigger malignant threat 
responses (Edmondson et al., 2003). Furthermore, whn politics arise in teams with power 
imbalances, there is a risk that the preferences of the powerful are forced through, regardless 
of their merits, and the valid preferences of the less powerful are discarded, reducing the 
likelihood of decision success (Dean and Sharfman, 1996). The third key moderator in the 
model outlined in Figure 1, behavioral integration, is incorporated because it reflects the 
degree to which team members engage in mutual and collective interaction, or in essence, 
their degree of teamness (Carmeli and Haveli, 2009). We maintain that behaviorally 
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integrated TMTs are better able to countermand the corrosive effects of political behavior 
because they enjoy harmonized social and task processes—which promote information 
elaboration and effective dispute resolution (Carmelli and Schaubroeck, 2006; Simsek et al., 
2005).  
--------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 here 
--------------------------------- 
In sum, our central claim is that cognitive consensus, power decentralization, and 
behavioral integration enable TMTs to stymie the more pernicious effects of political 
behavior. Taken together, these cognitive, structural, and behavioral factors distinguish well-
functioning teams—characterized by high levels of intragroup trust, information elaboration 
and constructive debate—from dysfunctional teams.  
We focus on explaining the implications of political behavior for decision quality, 
because the success or otherwise of individual strategic decisions ultimately determine 
whether firms adapt and prosper, or fail (Baum and Wally, 2003; Eisenhardt, 1989; Judge and 
Miller, 1991). Since strategic decisions have a major magnitude of impact on organizations, 
often entailing a significant financial outlay and are novel, uncertain, and ill-structured 
(Eisenhardt and Zbaracki 1992; Mintzberg et al. 1976; Shrivastava and Grant 1985)—theory 
development in the strategic decision-making domain is vital. Examples of strategic decisions 
include mergers and acquisitions, corporate restructu ing and entry into new markets (Dean 
and Sharfman, 1996; Papadakis et al., 1998).  
We center our theory development on individual strategic decisions since prior 
research shows that firms do not have consistent decision processes; rather, the process 
adopted varies from one decision to another, even within the same firm (Hickson et al., 1986; 
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Papadakis et al., 1998). Adopting individual strategic decisions as the unit of analysis enables 
us to isolate the role of the TMT in moderating the eff cts of politics on decision quality, and 
in doing so, begin to develop more micro level theories of political behavior. Furthermore, a 
decisional level of analysis provides a close link between political behavior during the 
strategic decision process and the direct outcomes of that process (Dean and Sharfman, 1996; 
Elbanna, 2006)—as opposed to examining the effects of politics on overall organizational 
performance, which can be problematic owing to causal ordering ambiguity (Forbes, 2007) 
and because performance is impacted on by an array of exogenous factors (Pearce et al., 
1987). 
 
Political behavior and decision quality 
Prior theory has posited both negative (e.g. Dean and Sharfman, 1996; Elbanna and 
Child, 2007; Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 1988) and positive (e.g. Elbanna, 2018; Elbanna et 
al., 2017; Kane-Frieder et al., 2013; Pfeffer, 1981) consequences of political behavior. We 
argue that this dissensus can be reconciled by advancing a theoretical account viewing the 
effects of political behavior on decision quality as being moderated by the TMT’s underlying 
psychological context. Politics includes covert tactics such as use of power to defend 
interests, agenda control, off-line lobbying and cooptation, and the strategic use of 
information (Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 1988; Eisenhardt and Zbaracki, 1992)—which in 
teams lacking psychological safety—can be highly provocative and fracture interpersonal 
relations. Consequently, ceteris paribus, the divisive nature of politics can trigger retaliatory 
interpersonal hostilities which undermine a TMT’s ability to adequately elaborate 
information and mount major strategic changes on a timely basis.  
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Specifically, political behavior often distracts executives’ attention away from their 
key responsibilities, which causes delayed responses, and lost opportunities (Eisenhardt and 
Bourgeois, 1988). Political behavior also impedes information elaboration (Cyert and March, 
1963; Pettigrew, 1973), and decisions taken on the basis of incomplete or inaccurate 
information are likely to result in suboptimal choices. When information is withheld by team 
members, attempts at accurately appraising environmental conditions are hindered, resulting 
in choices which might not be feasible given the prvailing environmental conditions 
(Hickson et al., 1986). Strategic decisions driven largely by political behavior are also likely 
to be motivated by the interests of one, or a small number of executives, rather than on the 
basis of what is optimal for the firm as a whole (Pttigrew, 1977; Pfeffer, 1981). Finally, 
political behavior imposes additional and unnecessary constraints on perfectly viable decision 
options (Nutt, 1993), since promising options may be discounted if they are not favorable to 
powerful individuals or alliances (Dean and Sharfman, 1996). The preceding arguments 
suggest the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1. Political behavior will be negatively related to decision quality. 
 
The moderating role of cognitive consensus 
Our core argument is that while political behavior is inevitable during strategic 
decision-making (Elbanna et al., 2017; Pettigrew, 1973), not all TMTs will react similarly 
(Child et al., 2010). Hence we focus our theory development on the TMT characteristics that 
can weaken the negative effects of politics on decision quality. We argue that cognitive 
consensus—agreement among TMT members concerning the goals, strategies and strengths 
of the firm—weakens the causal relation between political behavior and decision quality. 
TMTs with higher levels of cognitive consensus, in the face of political behavior, will be 
more trusting (Cannon-Bowers and Salas, 2001; Kellermans et al., 2005) of the intentions of 
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those engaging in politics owing to their high levels of psychological safety, and hence less 
retaliatory and aggressive in their responses. This is in contrast with members of cognitively 
diverse teams; who will feel threatened by the political actions of others and retaliate with 
interpersonal conflict and hostility, thereby paralyzing the decision process and jeopardizing 
decision quality.  
 Political behavior will naturally arise even in consensual TMTs—owing to the 
uncertain and high-stakes nature of strategic decision-making (Child et al., 2010; Eisenhardt 
and Bourgeois, 1988; Pettigrew, 1973), and because organizations comprise divisions with 
competing interests and claims on scarce resources (Bourgeois, 1981; Cyert and March, 
1963; Elbanna, 2006). Hence, although individual memb rs of consensual TMTs will use 
politics; high levels of agreement concerning the strategies, strengths and priorities of the 
firm means there is less need to use politics to coerce; instead, executives can direct political 
tactics toward facilitating successful decision implementation—for example as a means of 
obtaining necessary resources, unblocking systems of legitimate influence, and reducing 
inertia (Elbanna, 2018; Elbanna et al., 2017; Kimura, 2015). 
 Although political behavior usually risks undermining constructive debate as 
information gets withheld or distorted, this poses much less risk to decision quality in 
cognitively consensual TMTs; since there is less need for constructive debate and team 
maintenance in order to reconcile differences of opini n, due to high levels of shared 
understanding and commonly held beliefs (Daft and Lengel, 1986; Zenger and Lawrence, 
1989; Smith et al., 1994). However, political behavior is much more inflammatory in 
cognitively diverse teams, and there is a heightened risk of restricted information flows 
resulting in decisions not being thoroughly debated, and divergent viewpoints being 
sidelined; the net effect being inadequate information elaboration and damaging retaliatory 
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actions from marginalized team members who attempt to obstruct or sabotage the decision, 
which ultimately strengthens the negative relation between politics and decision quality.  
Cognitively consensual TMTs have an underlying climate of psychological safety and 
trust built on shared beliefs (Daft and Lengel, 1986; Zenger and Lawrence, 1989). Thus 
cognitive consensus weakens the negative effects of politics on decision quality because it 
reduces the likelihood of TMT members retaliating against the political behavior of others, 
owing to the fact they are more trusting of the intntions of those engaging in politics. To 
conclude, attempts by executives within consensual TMTs to influence the strategic decision 
process through political behavior are less likely to trigger unproductive relational conflict, 
which would otherwise limit information elaboration a d slow decision-making, risking 
missed opportunities and delayed responses (Dean and Sharfman, 1996; Elbanna, 2006). The 
preceding arguments suggest the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2. Political behavior has a weaker, less negative relationship with decision 
quality when cognitive consensus is high, than when it is low. 
 
The moderating role of power decentralization 
Power decentralization is the extent to which CEOs distribute power and 
responsibility for strategic decision-making evenly among TMT members (Finkelstein, 1992; 
Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996). We argue that the ext nt to which politics undermines 
decision quality will also vary according to the TMs underlying power structures. TMTs 
who evenly share power and responsibility for strategic decision-making will react differently 
to political behavior—and be able to safeguard better information elaboration in the face of 
political behavior—relative to TMTs where power is concentrated in the hands of one, or 
only a small number of executives.  
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When political behavior occurs in TMTs with power imbalances, there is a risk that 
the preferences of the powerful are favored, regardless of their merits, and the perfectly valid 
and viable preferences of the less powerful are discarded, reducing the likelihood of decision 
success (Dean and Sharfman, 1996). Decentralization empowers top managers to prevent the 
personal preferences and biases of any one individual top manager or subgroup unduly 
influencing strategic choices, regardless of the political tactics employed, thereby weakening 
the negative causal relation between political behavior and decision quality.  
The equitable distribution of power also has a motivational effect (Lanaj et al., 2013) 
which lessens the need for TMT members to use politics to enhance their power base or to 
further their own personal agendas, but rather galvanizes the team thereby increasing their 
propensity to use politics for the benefit of the wider collective—for example as a means of 
garnering support and building commitment to ensure ccessful implementation. Sharing 
power within the TMT also induces active participaton, and greater communication and 
information exchange between TMT members (Cao et al., 2010), thus promoting information 
elaboration and reducing the likelihood of decision quality being undermined by individual 
TMT members using political tactics such as withholding or manipulating information (Cao 
et al., 2010; Thanos et al., 2017). Decentralized TMTs benefit from inclusive decision-
making, emboldening TMT members to surface differing views and opinions safe in the 
knowledge that they are unlikely to face being ostracized (Carmelli and Schaubroeck, 2006; 
Edmondson et al., 2003), which ultimately attenuates th  potentially negative effects of 
political behavior on decision quality.  
When powerful executives within centralized TMTs engage in political acts such as 
withholding and manipulating information, responses from subordinated TMT members will 
be emotive and insurgent; that is, subordinated team members will actively resist change 
(West and Anderson, 1996) and compete for supremacy (Spears et al., 2001; Tajfel and 
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Turner, 1986), actions which hamper information elabor tion and escalate hostilities, 
ultimately threatening the prospects of success. Centralized TMTs are more likely to 
experience high levels of identity threat (Ashforth and Mael, 1989; Haslam, 2004; Tajfel et 
al., 1971; Turner et al., 1987) because the status of marginalized top managers as central 
members of the dominant coalition are imperiled. Such identity threats strengthen the 
damaging effects of political behavior, as individual team members seek to protect their self-
interests by resisting decisions that threaten their psychological sense of self, heightening 
their personal identity concerns at the expense of the team.  
In contrast, when responsibility for strategic decision-making is distributed evenly 
among upper echelons executives, it reinforces the hared identity of the TMT as a collective 
whole and team members pull together, actively and jointly shaping the future strategic 
direction of the firm. The preceding arguments suggest the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3. Political behavior has a weaker, less negative relationship with decision 
quality when power decentralization is high, than when it is low. 
 
The moderating role of behavioral integration 
TMT behavioral integration moderates the effects of political behavior on decision 
quality because such teams possess the requisite skills to handle political behavior 
constructively. Behaviorally integrated TMTs react differently to politics owing to their high 
levels of unity—members trust in one another’s ability to use politics as an agent for 
circumventing ‘red tape’ and facilitating effective strategic change—while safeguarding 
against the risks of diminished information elaborati n, which is a major risk factor 
associated with political behavior (Dean and Sharfmn, 1996).  
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When politics arise in behaviorally integrated TMTs, such teams are able to prevent 
political behavior from spawning a downward spiral of ever-escalating relationship conflict 
that might threaten the team’s effectiveness, and result in missed opportunities and/or delayed 
responses to impending threats. This is because behaviorally integrated TMTs have a 
collaborative culture (Hambrick, 1994), meaning that te m members react tactfully to the 
political actions of others and channel divergence within the team to facilitate accurate 
appraisals of issues (Carmeli and Schaubroeck, 2006), while reducing their propensity to 
retaliate against politics through interpersonal conflict, hostility, and aggression. Hence, the 
net effect of high levels of behavioral integration s to weaken the damaging effects of 
political behavior on decision quality.  
Behavioral integration captures the extent to which the TMT behaves as a true team, 
characterized by intense mutual and collaborative int raction (Hambrick, 1994), contrasting 
teams that exist simply as collections of “semiautonomous barons” (Hambrick, 2007: 336). 
Behavioral integration thus represents the wholeness of a TMT and its unity of effort 
(Lubatkin et al., 2006). By fostering intense cooperation, behavioral integration promotes 
high quality information exchange (Simsek et al., 2005), thus weakening the tendency for 
political behavior to undermine decision quality through diminished information elaboration. 
In contrast, behavioral disintegration exacerbates the problems associated with inadequate 
information elaboration, strengthening the risks of p litical behavior leading to biased 
choices made on the basis of incorrect or inadequat information. This is because when 
behavioral integration is absent, team members act autonomously and focus on their own area 
of the organization (Hambrick, 1998; 2007) limiting communication between team members 
to infrequent bilateral exchanges (Hambrick et al., 2001). Hence TMTs lacking behavioral 
integration are much more susceptible to the deleterious consequences of political behavior. 
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Behaviorally integrated TMTs are also better able to confront the high levels of 
uncertainty, risk and politics inherent in strategic decision-making, because they are more 
adept at managing team members’ identity concerns, stemming from a stronger sense of 
shared identity throughout the team as a whole; that is,  strongly held superordinate team 
identity (Carmeli and Shteigman, 2010). Such a shared identity helps to lessen intragroup 
anxiety, and promotes effective intragroup functioning (Gaertner and Dovidio, 2000; 
Gaertner et al., 1994; Stone and Crisp, 2007). Further, since behaviorally integrated TMTs 
are characterized by frequent and intense social interaction, the social mind’s natural 
tendency to categorize, differentiate, and discriminate (Allport, 1954) is dampened, thus 
reducing power asymmetries and associated behavioral dysfunctions within the group 
(Pettigrew, 1998). Hence, members of behaviorally integrated TMTs react more skillfully to 
the political actions of significant others, channeling dissent constructively so as to produce a 
diversity of arguments, while ensuring multiple viewpoints are considered and opposing 
views reconciled to create shared understandings (Carmelli and Schaubroeck, 2006)—the 
overall effect being to weaken the negative effects of politics on decision quality. 
In sum, behavioral integration endows TMTs with a high degree of psychological 
safety, fostering free information exchange, decisive dispute resolution, and the creation of 
shared understandings of strategic issues (Lubatkin e  al., 2006)—all of which serve to 
weaken the pernicious effects of political behavior on decision quality. These arguments 
suggest the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4. Political behavior has a weaker, less negative relationship with decision 






Sample and procedure 
We sent separate surveys to two top managers in each of 236 UK based firms that 
formed our sample frame, of whom 117 (approximately 50%) returned usable data. The 
participants completed and returned the surveys independently, so as to minimize within firm 
cross-contamination. We used the Financial Access Made Easy (FAME1) database for our 
sampling frame and as a source of secondary data.  
The sample drawn from the FAME database was restricted to firms with between 50 
and 500 employees. We did so because the strategic d cision processes of very small firms 
are more likely to be driven by one individual rather than a team (Brouthers et al., 1998), 
whereas firms with over 500 employees have much more c mplex organizational systems 
that might render the influence of TMTs less salient (Lubatkin et al., 2006; Simsek et al., 
2005). While prior studies in the strategic decision-making literature are based predominantly 
on manufacturing firms, because the service sector represents a vital component of the UK 
economy and many other Western economies (Papadakis et al., 2010), we sampled all 
firms—incorporating manufacturing and services sectors—thereby extending the 
generalizability of our findings.  
The FAME database contains data pertaining to 11 million UK firms. For the 
purposes of our study we constructed our sampling frame by applying the following criteria 
to the firms listed: 1) having between 50 and 500 employees; 2) having a primary UK trading 
address; 3) being private sector based; 4) providing complete contact details for all of their 
legal officers; 5) providing a minimum of five years of complete performance data; and 6) 
                                                          
1FAME is “the most accurate and popular database of UK irms” (Souitaris and Maestro, 2010: 661), which 
provides access to the financial information on 11 million UK and Irish companies. FAME data is taken directly 
from Companies House, which is a Government department responsible for incorporating and dissolving 
companies, registering the information companies ar legally required to supply, and making that information 
available to the public. 
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not being in receivership, dormant, or having been recently acquired. A total of 6,000 firms 
prima facie met these criteria. On closer inspection, however, 32 of these firms were found to 
be duplicate entries in the database and/or had listed ncorrect contact details. Hence, the final 
sampling frame comprised 5,968 firms, all of which were approached. To be incorporated in 
the study, however, the firms we approached had to meet two additional requirements, 
namely: 7) they must have made a recent strategic decision, with sufficient time having 
elapsed to enable assessment of the outcomes of that decision; and 8) they had to provide two 
TMT informants with sufficient knowledge to offer detailed, in-depth responses to our survey 
questions. A total of 236 firms indicated that they satisfied our qualifying criteria, of which 
117 subsequently returned usable data, i.e. fully completed questionnaires from their 
respective pair of informants. 
We purposefully used two informants in each firm to mitigate common method bias 
(Podsakoff et al., 2003) by operationalizing our first nformant’s measures for our 
independent, moderator and certain control variables, and our second informants’ measures 
for our dependent variable. To further mitigate common method bias, wherever possible we 
utilized objective secondary FAME data to operationalize our variables. 
To ameliorate validity concerns arising from the usof key informants and to build on 
the key informant approaches of prior strategic decision-making research (e.g. Elbanna and 
Child, 2007; Goll and Rasheed, 1997; 2005), we went to extensive lengths to identify the best 
qualified informants to answer our surveys. We did so through an upfront and detailed 
telephone conversation with the legally designated key TMT contact in each of the 236 firms 
in our sample, and through a series of subsequent me ings and telephone conversations with 
the two key informants in each firm. We formally examined both informants’ competency 
(Kumar et al., 1993) by asking each of them to ratetheir involvement in making the focal 
decision, and their confidence in answering the questions we posed to them, using 7-point 
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Likert scales. The average involvement (mean = 6.44; SD = 0.73 for first informants and 
mean = 6.05; SD = 0.78 for second informants), and confidence (mean = 6.33; SD = 0.70 for 
first informants and mean = 6.14; SD = 0.75 for second informants) scores suggest that they 
were indeed suitably qualified to participate in the study. 
To further safeguard the validity of our data we stipulated that informants must both 
be part of the inner circle of top managers, with responsibility for setting the strategic 
direction of the firm (Simsek et al. 2005; Smith et al., 2005), and with major involvement in 
the focal decision (Amason, 1996; Pettigrew, 1992). We also ensured that informants were 
referencing a recent salient event (a strategic decision) to reduce cognitive bias (Miller et al., 
1997), and we offered a report to informants benchmarking their firm against the other firms 
in our dataset, which would be rendered meaningless in the absence of valid data (Dean and 
Sharfman, 1996). Informants were guaranteed anonymity to further encourage valid 
responses (Huber and Power, 1985).  
We identified the focal strategic decision with informants through a series of 
preliminary meetings and telephone conversations, esuring the nominated decisions met our 
definition of a strategic decision. When distributing the surveys to our key informants, we 
also provided a written confirmation of the previously selected decision, and requested 
surveys be completed in relation to that particular decision. As a final check, we asked both 
informants to provide a detailed description of the decision. No firm in our sample provided 
more than one decision, and to increase the validity of our results, we only included in our 
analysis decisions for which we had the complete responses from two informants.  
 
Unit of analysis 
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We use individual strategic decisions as our unit of analysis instead of organizations 
because, as noted earlier, prior empirical research has demonstrated that strategic decision 
processes differ substantially within an organization according to the decision being made 
(e.g. Elbanna et al., 2017; Hickson et al., 1986). Strategic decisions in our sample fell into 
four types: new business investment decisions such as mergers and acquisitions (21%); 
investments in capital equipment such as new premises (10%); investment in the marketing 
domain such as support for new product launches (46%), and; internal reorganization 
investments such as corporate restructuring (23%). First informants were all top managers, 
and comprised CEOs (59%), chief officers (21%), chairpersons (10%), and executive 
directors (10%). Second informants were also top managers and comprised chief officers 
(42%), executive directors (39%), CEOs (14%), and chairpersons (5%).  
 
Measures 
 The background details pertaining to our measures ar  ummarized in Table 1. In all 
cases, unless otherwise indicated in the table, participants evaluated the items using a 7-point 
Likert scale. In addition, we incorporated a series of control variables to rule out alternative 
influences that could potentially have a bearing on the study’s core constructs. We controlled 
for past firm performance because this variable significantly influences firm survival and thus 
impacts on both behavior and future prospects of success (Elbanna and Child, 2007). We also 
controlled for firm size (Log size), because larger firms have greater resources at their 
disposal, which again can have a bearing on decision outcomes (Rodrigues and Hickson, 
1995). Both of these control variables were operation lized using objective secondary data 
drawn from the FAME database. We accounted for enviro mental hostility since this variable 
poses significant threats to firm survival and thus can influence both behavior and decision 
outcomes (Castrogiovanni, 1991; Staw et al., 1981; Thanos et al., 2017). To account for the 
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idiosyncratic nature of strategic decisions we adopted the classification of Papadakis et al. 
(1998) and operationalized a series of dummy (0/1) variables for each of the four decision 
types (new business investment decisions, investments in capital equipment, investment in 
the marketing domain and internal reorganization investments). Finally, we controlled for 
procedural rationality, given its well established influence on decision outcomes (Dean and 
Sharfman, 1996; Elbanna and Child, 2007).  
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 here 
--------------------------------- 
Non-response bias 
Using FAME archival data, we compared responding against non-responding firms on 
four key criteria using t-tests. We found no statisically significant differences between 
responding and non-responding firms for sales (p = .35), profitability (p = .73), industry (p = 
.30), and number of employees (p = .15). We therefore conclude that our results are not 
unduly influenced by non-response bias.  
 
Reliability and validity 
As shown in Table 2, the reliabilities of the various multi-item Likert scales 
incorporated in this study (coefficient Alpha) range from 0.74 to 0.91, well above the 
commonly accepted threshold of 0.70 (Nunnally, 1978), suggesting a satisfactory degree of 
internal consistency for all of our self-report instruments. Table 2 reports the alpha 
coefficients, average variance extracted results (AVEs), variable characteristics, and 






Insert Table 2 here 
--------------------------------- 
Although we used established measures for operationalizi g all of our study variables, 
in accordance with the recommendations of Campbell and Fiske (1959), we assessed both 
convergent and discriminant validity, using both exploratory and confirmatory factor 
analysis. Table 3 presents the results of our exploratory factor analysis, and because of the 
large number of items involved, so as to avoid violat ns of recommended ratios of cases to 
items (Bauer et al., 2001) we ran three sets of factor analyses (Hart and Banbury, 1994) thus 
ensuring stable factor solutions. The three sets comprise one each for decision processes 
(politics and rationality), TMT characteristics (cognitive consensus and behavioral 
integration), and the environment and decision outcomes (environmental hostility and 
decision quality). The measures were subjected to a series of principal components analyses, 
rotated to simple structure using the direct oblimin oblique rotation method, as commonly 
recommended (e.g. Mooi et al., 2018). The resulting pattern matrices indicate that the 
measures attained acceptable convergent and discriminant validity in line with expectations.  
We also performed confirmatory factor analysis, following Fornell and Larcker’s 
(1981) procedure to further establish the discriminant validity of our measures. We compared 
the average variance extracted (AVE) of each construct o its shared variance with other 
constructs, following Farrell (2010). In all instances, the average variance extracted from the 
constructs exceeded the shared variance between any two constructs. The highest shared 
variance was 0.22 (between political behavior and behavioral integration). However, the 
AVE for each of these constructs (political behavior, 0.58, and behavioral integration, 0.74) 
far exceeds the shared variance. These results demonstrate that the measures attain sufficient 
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discriminant validity, and overall our tests of convergent and discriminant validity provide 
confidence that our regression results are not unduly influenced by measurement error. 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 here 
--------------------------------- 
Results 
We use multiple moderated hierarchical regression analysis to test our hypotheses, by 
regressing the second informants’ measures of decision quality onto blocks of the first 
informants’ predictor variables. Table 4 shows five nested models to isolate the additional 
variance explained when our moderators and interaction terms are each introduced into the 
regression equation. This approach facilitates comparison of the relative importance of TMT 
cognitive, structural, and behavioral contingencies and enables the comparison of the relative 
degree of explanatory power of the various iterations f our model using R2. We mean 
centered all predictor variables to aid interpretation (Aiken and West, 1991; Echambadi and 
Hess, 2007).  The variance inflation scores across the various regression models ranged from 
1.07 to 1.90, thus suggesting multicollinearity is not a major concern (Hair et al., 2014).  
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 here 
--------------------------------- 
Supporting our first hypothesis, step 1 of our model shows that political behavior has 
a statistically significant and negative effect on decision quality (β = -0.26, p = 0.01). 
However, step 3 shows that the hypothesized interaction between political behavior and 
cognitive consensus, while in the predicted direction, s not statistically significant (β = 0.10, 
p = 0.26). Hence, we cannot claim support for hypothesis 2. Hypothesis 3, however, is 
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supported, because step 4 shows that the political behavior × power decentralization 
interaction is statistically significant and in the predicted direction (β = 0.19, p = 0.04), and 
the interaction term explains a statistically significant amount of additional variance in the 
dependent variable decision quality (∆R² = 0.03, p = 0.04). To facilitate interpretation of this 
interaction, Figure 2 presents a plot of the relationships, indicating high and low levels of 
power decentralization by values one standard deviation bove and below the mean (Aiken 
and West, 1991). The results show that high levels of political behavior are far less damaging 
for decision quality in decentralized TMTs than compared to highly centralized teams. 
Step 5 of our regression model reveals strong support for our fourth hypothesis; that 
is, the political behavior × behavioral integration nteraction is statistically significant and in 
the predicted direction (β = 0.29, p = 0.01). This interaction also explains a statistically 
significant amount of additional variance in decision quality (∆R² = 0.05, p = 0.01). To 
facilitate interpretation of this interaction Figure 3 shows a plot of the relationships, 
indicating high and low levels of behavioral integration by values one standard deviation 
above and below the mean (Aiken and West, 1991). As can be seen, the results suggest that 
political behavior causes far less damage to decision quality in behaviorally TMTs than 
compared to behaviorally disintegrated teams.  
---------------------------------- 




We performed a series of tests to assess the robustness of the models we estimated. 
Following the procedures of Hayes (2013), we utilized the Johnson-Neyman regions of 
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significance test to determine the effects of political behavior on decision quality at differing 
scores of power decentralization and behavioral integration. The results show that 2.95 (out 
of 4) is the critical power decentralization score; b low this value, political behavior has a 
statistically significant and negative impact on decision quality, but above this level, political 
behavior has a statistically non-significant effect. Similarly, the results show that 4.55 (out of 
7) is the critical behavioral integration score, since below this value political behavior exerts 
a statistically significant negative effect on decision quality, whereas above this value the 
effects of political behavior become statistically non-significant. The results of these analyses 
provide further insights into the effects proposed by Hypotheses 3 and 4.
Endogeneity concerns may arise empirically as a correlation between an estimated 
parameter and the residual (Hamilton and Nickerson 2003; Wooldridge, 2010). Theoretically, 
our focus on explaining decision quality rather than performance, which can be both an 
antecedent and outcome of political behavior, mitigates the possibility of reverse causality 
(Dean and Sharfman, 1996; Elbanna, 2006). Neverthelss, we tested for endogeneity using 
the Durbin-Wu-Hausman (D-W-H) test per Davidson andMacKinnon (1993), using TMT 
size for identification purposes, and the result (t = -0.82, p = 0.42) suggests that endogeneity 
is not a major concern.  
Finally, we tested for mediation following the approach of Baron and Kenny (1986), 
to determine whether political behavior mediates the effects of TMT cognitive consensus, 
power decentralization and behavioral integration on decision quality. We conclude that 
neither mediation nor partial mediation is indicated, since neither step 2 (regressing the 
mediator onto the independent variables), nor step 3 (regressing the dependent variable onto 
the mediator and independent variables), of Baron and Kenny’s (1986) four step approach are 





The central aim of this article was to develop new theoretical insights into the 
psychological mechanisms enabling TMTs to countermand the negative effects of political 
behavior. Based on suggestions that extant strategic d cision-making research has paid 
insufficient attention to the contingent influence of the TMT, and that this body of research is 
inadequately grounded in human psychology, we theoriz d that cognitive consensus, power 
decentralization, and behavioral integration are central generative mechanisms that equip 
TMTs with the ability to stymie the deleterious effects of politics on decision quality.  
As discussed previously, although Elbanna and Child (2007) examined the 
moderating effects of environmental, decision and firm characteristics on the relationship 
between politics and decision success, prior to the s udy reported in the present article, this 
line of inquiry has not included TMT moderators. This is despite prior reviews in the strategic 
decision-making domain highlighting the TMT as a key contextual influence (Rajagopalan et 
al., 1993; Shepherd and Rudd, 2014). The absence of th ry concerning the contingent role of 
TMT variables is problematic, not least because politica  behavior essentially concerns social 
exchanges between top managers (Hickson et al., 1986). Hence, a focus on the psychological 
context surrounding the TMT is required to advance theory concerning why political 
behavior can have highly destructive effects in some teams, but less so in others. Building on 
the insights of upper echelons theory and research (Hambrick, 2007; Hambrick and Mason, 
1984), the present study has taken the first steps to address this gap. 
 
Theoretical implications 
Despite the utility of an upper echelons perspectiv for explaining strategic decision-
making processes and outcomes, the TMT and strategic d c sion-making research streams 
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have largely evolved independently (Goll and Rasheed, 2005). This represents a significant 
gap in theory, because, as we have seen, the fortunes of an organization are fundamentally 
shaped by its top executives and the decisions they take. Therefore, in our investigation of 
political behavior in strategic decision-making, wepurposefully adopted an upper echelons 
perspective to view the causal relation between politics and decision quality as being 
moderated by the psychological characteristics of the TMT.  
Much of the prior upper echelons research has largely elied on demographic 
variables as surrogates for the underlying behaviors, traits, and processes of top managers 
(Mannor et al., 2016). While these studies have clearly shown that top managers matter a 
great deal (Hambrick, 2007; Priem et al., 1999), inconsistent findings have raised questions 
concerning the validity of using demographic proxies to investigate the underlying decision 
processes at work (Carmeli and Schaubroeck, 2006). One of the most serious criticisms of 
using demographic variables in TMT studies is that it leaves a “black box” of unexplained 
behaviors and processes (Hodgkinson and Sparrow, 2002; Lawrence, 1997; Pettigrew, 1992).  
We addressed this major limitation in the present study by operationalizing direct 
psychometric measures for all of our TMT constructs, enabling us to provide new theoretical 
insights into how TMTs cope with political behavior, which inevitably arises during strategic 
decision-making, to safeguard decision quality. 
The empirical results of this study were largely consistent with its hypotheses, thus 
supporting our contention that political behavior is not invariably as damaging as past 
theorizing suggests (cf. Bourgeois and Eisenhardt, 1988; Dean and Sharfman, 1996; Elbanna 
and Child, 2007). The results have also demonstrated that TMTs with decentralized power 
structures are less prone to the damaging effects of political behavior, owing to their high 
levels of psychological safety. However, behaviorally integrated TMTs, owing to their 
intense collaborative interactions and unity of effort, are even better able to navigate the 
28 
 
complex and risky process of strategic decision-making, without allowing the process to 
become subverted by damaging political behavior. Hence, this study highlights the 
fundamental importance of behavioral integration as the central psychological mechanism 
which serves to dampen the corrosive effects of politics. We argue that prior research on 
political behavior has not fully capitalized on a psychological perspective (Powell et al. 
2011), which is troublesome since political behavior directly involves social interactions 
between strategic actors (Hickson et al., 1986). We thus contribute to theory by opening up 
the black box (Lawrence, 1997; Markoczy, 1997; Pettigrew, 1992; Priem et al., 1999) of 
TMT psychological factors that shape the overall success, or otherwise, of strategic decisions. 
Moreover, the findings indicate that TMT behaviors (behavioral integration) are a more 
potent moderator than TMT structures (power decentralization), whereas TMT cognition (i.e. 
cognitive consensus) does not moderate the impact of political behavior.  
 An implication of our research for strategic decision-making theory, more generally, 
is the importance of being sensitive to the broader context. When our moderator variables and 
interaction terms are added to the regression model, they explain an additional 16% of 
variance in decision quality, thereby demonstrating how the explanatory capability of extant 
decision process theories can be bolstered by including contingency factors—and in 
particular—TMT contingent influences. Decontextualiz t on of political behavior risks 
ignoring the embeddedness of top managers in the broade  context (Carpenter, 2002; Nielsen 
and Nielsen, 2013), and while prior research has comprehensively accounted for the 
contingent role of the external environment (e.g. Eisenhardt, 1989; Fredrickson and Mitchell, 
1984; Judge and Miller, 1991; Goll and Rasheed, 1997), considerably less attention has 
focused on other layers of context, such as TMT attributes (Shepherd and Rudd, 2014). 
Another inference arising from our study is that behavioral integration is a pivotal 
construct because behaviorally integrated teams are bett r able to manage team members’ 
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social identity concerns (cf. Ashforth and Mael, 1989; Haslam, 2004; Healey and 
Hodgkinson, 2017; Hodgkinson and Healey, 2008; 2011; 20 4; Tajfel et al., 1971; Turner et 
al., 1987). Such identity threats will naturally arise during strategic decision-making, because 
strategic decisions are inherently ill-structured an complex (Shrivastava and Grant, 1985), 
with major long-term ramifications (Eisenhardt and Zbaracki, 1992). It is probable that 
behaviorally integrated TMTs, owing to their superordinate team identity and intense mutual 
collaboration, are much less prone to dysfunctional social categorization processes and 
associated fault lines (cf. Lau and Murnighan, 1998). Future research could therefore 
investigate the role of social identity concerns, and ttendant social categorization processes, 
in moderating the effects of political behavior. Such work will ground strategic decision-
making research more firmly in realistic assumptions about human behavior.  
   
Future research and limitations 
As with any research, the present study has limitations that could be addressed in 
future work. For instance, the cross-sectional research design employed in the present study 
limits the possibility of drawing causal inferences. Future research could therefore execute 
longitudinal research designs to more firmly establish causality.  
We purposefully designed our research methods to circumvent potential problems 
arising from common method variance by utilizing two different TMT informants, with one 
informant providing data on the predictor variables and another providing data on the 
dependent variable. However, future work could furthe  enhance confidence in the validity of 
the reported results by incorporating ratings from multiple TMT informants for independent 




In view of the fact that we only sampled firms with between 50 and 500 employees, 
our findings might not generalize to very small or ve y large organizations. To address this 
concern, future research might strive to replicate our findings, or extend them to the context 
of organizations with differing characteristics to th se of the present sample. Future research 
could also examine TMT contingency factors, such as political will and skill (Ferris et al., 
2005; Kapoutsis et al., 2017; Pettigrew and McNulty, 1995) and trust (McAllister, 1995), 
because the ability of top managers to handle politics skillfully, and trust in one another’s 
abilities to do so, are likely to be key additional factors that shape the processes and outcomes 
of political actions. 
  An unexpected result was our inability to detect a s atistically significant moderation 
effect of cognitive consensus. Given that consensus is a complex, multi-dimensional 
construct (cf. Kellermans et al., 2005; Tarakci et al., 2014), further theorizing and empirical 
investigations are required to more precisely understand the effects of cognitive consensus 
(and related constructs such as diversity). Since consensus and diversity can be 
operationalized in different ways (cf. Hodgkinson and Sparrow, 2002; Kellermans et al., 
2005; Tarakci et al 2014), theorizing according to the differing dimensions of consensus or 
diversity will yield further useful insights.  
 Finally, in line with the recommendation of Aguinis et al. (2018), future research 
might profitably address with greater precision the focal level of analysis. In our case we 
focused on individual decisions, and we controlled for the influence of different decision 
types with a series of dummy variables. However, future research might consider sampling 
only certain types of decision, and researchers should ensure careful alignment between the 
level of analysis and the outcome variable studied. The decision process underpinning any 
one decision may exert only very weak effects on organizational performance owing to the 
numerous exogenous influences that determine performance. Hence, focusing on decision 
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quality as the outcome variable enables the more immediate relationship between the 
strategic decision process and its outcomes to be isolated, and avoids causal ordering 
ambiguity (Elbanna, 2006).  
 
Practical implications 
 Since political behavior is inevitable during strategic decision-making and, left 
unbridled, jeopardizes decision quality, developing a TMT with the ability to limit the 
damage caused by politics is of paramount importance.  
 Our findings highlight the importance of TMT power decentralization and behavioral 
integration as central to a TMT’s ability to weaken the negative effects of political behavior 
on decision quality. Hence, organizations should utilize selective hiring (Evans and Butler, 
2011) to recruit top managers—and in particular CEOs—who are naturally predisposed to 
shared decision-making, close collaboration, and the free exchange of information and ideas. 
Of particular importance is the need to identify and nurture senior executives with a servant 
leadership style, not least because leaders characterized by this particular style of leadership 
have a tendency to promote power sharing and a sense of community (Spears, 1996). 
Similarly, CEOs with a collectivist orientation foster group harmony and more readily 
emphasize the goals of the group over their personal interests (Simsek et al., 2005).    
 Further, strategy away days, strategic retreats, and strategic off-sites are specific 
practices that provide a practical means for building strong relationships among top managers 
(Hodgkinson et al., 2006). In particular, strategy away days that are carefully designed with 
clear objectives and a small number of participants, can facilitate interpersonal contact, foster 
cohesion, and build a shared identity (Healey et al., 2015)—essential traits for TMTs to 
manage political behavior more effectively and, in so doing, create the enabling conditions 
for enhancing the quality of their decision processes and outcomes.  
32 
 
Finally, formal team interaction training—teaching top managers how to function 
better as a team—is another activity that can be utilized to foster behavioral integration, and 
to work more effectively in the uncertain and dynamic context of strategic decision-making. 
This type of training entails TMTs learning how to alter their coordination practices, adjust 
their patterns of communication, and even reassign roles to ensure effective task execution 
(Marks et al., 2000). Formal team interaction training can thus equip top managers with the 
skills to use politics more judiciously for the benefit of the decision at hand, and to respond 
more appropriately to the political actions of others.  
 
Conclusion 
Most strategic decisions are ultimately political (cf. Johnson, 1987, 1988; Pettigrew, 
1973, 1985; Pfeffer, 1981), and prior empirical research has tended to emphasize the 
damaging effects of political behavior on such decisions and attendant organizational 
outcomes (cf. Buchanan, 2008; Mintzberg, 1983; Silvester, 2008). However, strategic 
decision theory has not yet adequately explained how TMTs cope with the inevitable politics 
in play. In particular, prior to the study reported in this article, there has been a paucity of 
work that has examined directly the underlying psychological mechanisms that enable some 
teams to withstand the corrosive effects of political behavior. Addressing this shortfall, we 
have theorized that TMTs characterized by high levels of cognitive consensus, power 
decentralization and behavioral integration fare better relative to their counterparts marked by 
lower levels of these contingent variables. Supporting our theorizing, our findings indicate 
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Figure 1  
Theoretical model. 
Figure 2 
Moderating effects of power decentralization on the relationship between political 
behavior and decision quality. 
H4 H3 H2 
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Behavioral integration Power decentralization Cognitive consensus 









Outline description of the measures employed in the s udy. 
Measures Data 
source 
Items  Source 
Decision quality Second 
informant 
1. Quality of decision relative to its original 
intent; 
2. Quality of decision given its effect on company 
performance; 
3. Overall quality of decision  
Amason 
(1996) 
Political behavior First 
informant 
The extent to which: 
 
1. TMT members were primarily preoccupied by 
their own individual interests, or acted in the 
interests of the company.  
2. TMT members were open with each other 
about their interests and preferences related to the 
decision. 
3. TMT members used power to defend their 
interests and preferences.  
4. The decision affected by bargaining among 
TMT members  
5. TMT members formed alliances with each 

























Moderating effects of behavioral integration on the relationship between political 
behavior and decision quality. 
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6. TMT members tended to hide and/or distort 





Extent to which TMT members agreed about:  
1. The best way to maximize the company’s long 
term profitability.  
2. What the company’s goal priorities should be.  
3. The best way to ensure the company’s long-
term survival.  
4. Which company objectives should be 







Whether the decision was made: 
1. By the CEO alone; 
2. By the CEO in consultation with one or very 
few TMT members; 
3. By the CEO in consultation with most or all of 
the TMT members; 
4. By the entire TMT as a group. 






1. When a TMT member was busy, other TMT 
members often volunteered to help manage the 
workload; 
2. TMT members were flexible about switching 
responsibilities to make things easier for each 
other; 
3. TMT members were willing to help each other 
complete jobs and meet deadlines; 
4. TMT members usually let each other know 
when their actions would affect another member’s 
work; 
5. TMT members had a clear understanding of the 
joint problems and needs of other members; 
6. TMT members discussed their expectations of 
each other; 
7. The ideas that TMT members exchanged were 
of high quality; 
8. The solutions that TMT members exchanged 
were of high quality; 
9. The dialogue among TMT members produced a 










FAME data Number of full time employees in the year the 









The business environment was:  
1. Very risky; a false step can mean the 
company’s undoing; 
2. Very stressful, exacting, hostile; very hard to 
keep afloat; 
3. A dominating environment, in which your 
company’s initiatives count for very little against 










informant information in making this decision? 
2. How extensively did TMT members analyze 
relevant information before making the decision? 
3. There are some techniques which may be used 
to get more information for taking a decision (e.g. 
performing quantitative analysis, conducting 
feasibility studies, using consultants). To what 
extent did the TMT members rely on such 
techniques in making this decision? 
4. How effective were TMT members at focusing 
their attention on crucial information and ignoring 
irrelevant information? 
5. Please describe the process that had the most 








Detailed written description provided by 
informants and then coded as one of: new 
business investment decision; investments in 
capital equipment; investment in the marketing 
domain; internal reorganization investment. All 









Descriptive statistics, scale reliabilities and study variable intercorrelations. 
Variables Mean s.d. Coefficient 
Alpha 
Reliabilities 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1. Decision quality  
 
5.68 1.25 0.91 0.88             
2. Political behavior  2.42 1.01 0.74 -0.30 
(0.00) 
0.58            
3. Investment in new 
business  






-           
4. Investment in capital 
equipment 








-          
5. Investment in the 
marketing domain 










-         
6. Investment in 
reorganization 












-        
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0.85   
12. Power 
decentralization  




















































Rotated factor patterns. 
 Decision processes TMT characteristics Environment and decision 
outcomes 

















Extensively looking for information 0.83      
Analyzing information 0.86      
Techniques for obtaining information 0.68      
Focusing on crucial information 0.66      
Analytical decision process 0.79      
Preoccupation with individual interests  0.52     
Openness about interests and preferences  0.57     
Using power  0.69     
Bargaining  0.73     
Alliance formation  0.65     
Hiding and distorting information  0.72     
Volunteering to manage workload   0.74    
Switching responsibilities   0.84    
Helping each other    0.92    
Warning team members when actions would affect others   0.80    
Clear understanding of joint problems and needs   0.70    
Discussing expectations   0.55    
Exchanging high quality ideas   0.81    
Exchanging high quality solutions   0.77    
Dialogue producing creativity and innovativeness   0.78    
Maximizing profitability    0.91   
Goal priorities    0.87   
Long-term survival    0.89   
Most important objectives    0.83   
Risky environment     0.85  
Hard to keep afloat     0.87  
Dominating environment     0.79  
Decision quality relative to original intent      0.9  
Decision quality given effect on company performance      0.91 
Overall decision quality      0.95 
Eigenvalue 3.79 2.36 6.31 2.47 2.63 2.05 




Results of the hierarchical regression analysis for decision quality. 
 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5 
Controls: β P β P β P β P β P 
Investment in new business  -0.12 0.30 -0.10 0.36 -0.11 0.32 -0.13 0.23 -0.08 0.45 
Investment in capital equipment 0.00 0.97 -0.04 0.72 -0.05 0.62 -0.04 0.67 -0.05 0.58 
Investment in marketing  -0.07 0.58 -0.05 0.65 -0.08 0.51 -0.08 0.48 -0.10 0.39 
Past performance -0.04 0.65 0.04 0.70 0.03 0.72 0.02 0.81 0.04 0.67 
Firm size 0.04 0.66 0.01 0.91 0.01 0.95 -0.01 0.93 -0.02 0.86 
Environmental hostility 0.03 0.77 0.07 0.47 0.07 0.44 0.07 0.49 0.09 0.34 
Procedural rationality 0.26 0.01 0.12 0.25 0.11 0.27 0.08 0.41 0.04 0.72 
Political behavior (H1) -0.26 0.01 -0.15 0.13 -0.14 0.15 -0.12 0.21 -0.08 0.40 
           
Moderators:           
Cognitive consensus   0.17 0.06 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.11 0.22 0.02 
Power decentralization   0.19 0.05 0.18 0.07 0.18 0.06 0.16 0.10 
Behavioral integration   0.16 0.16 0.17 0.12 0.14 0.20 0.11 0.32 
           
Interactions:           
Political behavior × cognitive 
consensus (H2) 
    0.10 0.26 0.09 0.30 0.00 0.98 
Political behavior × power 
decentralization (H3) 
      0.19 0.04 0.08 0.40 
Political behavior × behavioral 
integration (H4) 
        0.29 0.01 
           
R² 0.18  0.25  0.26  0.29  0.34  
∆R² due to step   0.07 0.02 0.01 0.26 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.01 
n = 117;  
Standardized regression coefficients are shown;  
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